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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the British policy on West Irian during the early stage of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia. It focuses on the reasons why British supported the Dutch resolution to retain its 
colonial power on this ‘Komodo Island’. The main references are British official records from the 
British National Archive, Kew, London. Though they focus on British policy, the sources throw 
light on some of fundamental issues in Southeast Asia in general during that period. They prevail 
that although Western colonialization is a ‘taboo’ phrase, in some circumstances it was an ‘evil 
necessity.’ First, British support for Dutch colonialism in West Irian was to prevent a circumstance 
that could allow any external intrusion such as the communist and Russian from setting up their 
base on that island which could endanger this region. The need for the Dutch colonialism was 
crucial because the newly formed Indonesia was still inexperienced in administering and managing 
territories. Secondly, it was a measure to eliminate any intention of Indonesia to spread, or to 
conquer, its neighboring nations such as Australia New Guinea, Borneo and the Malay States. In 
other words, should they were to be allowed to take West Irian it would become a precedent for 
Indonesia to make subsequent claims on other British territories.   
© 2014 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the onset of the Cold War in the 1940s, the Dutch were still in power in Indonesia, and in 
the mainland, the French was still in power in Indo-China. In the north, the prospect of communist 
triumph in China redoubled the Western Allies attempt to make Southeast Asia a zone of free from 
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its influence. The British were one of the superpowers during that period. Though partially, they 
also involved in Indonesian politics after the Second World War and played a huge role in West 
Irian affairs especially in the negotiation between Indonesia and Netherlands. While the Far East 
was the main area of US responsibility, Southeast Asia was the main area of the British.
1
 In those 
circumstances, the British were more inclined to support Dutch occupation in West Irian.  
As one of the superpowers, British official records are among important sources to explore 
some of the main issues during that period. Evidently, they throw some light on British and Dutch 
political and military policies at the time as well as that of the Indonesia. This paper explores the 
reasons why the British supported the Dutch policy to retain their position in West Irian within a 
year after the 27 December 1949 Round Table Treaty? It also touches some of the reasons why the 
Dutch insisted on staying on the island and how Indonesia perceived the claims proposed by the 
Dutch. 
 
2. WEST IRIAN AT THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR  
As already discussed elsewhere, since the early twentieth century, Indonesian nationalists had 
sought an independent Indonesia covering all the territories occupied by the Dutch, including West 
Irian.
 2
  After a long struggle, Dutch rule ended with a Japanese invasion during World War II. The 
wheel of fortune turned in favor of Indonesian nationalists. At the end of Japanese occupation, on 
17 August 1945 they proclaimed their independence which led to the establishment of a free and 
independent Republic of Indonesia, covering the whole territory of the former Netherlands East 
Indies. The proclamation configured a strong momentum that led to an armed struggle, which 
ended with independence for Indonesia on 27 December 1949 after the Round Table Treaty. Power 
transfer occurred and the Dutch agreed to free the whole of Indonesia from their rule.  
According to the Round Table Treaty, those former Dutch territories would become a new 
sovereign state known as „The United States of Indonesia‟ (USI). Later the name was changed to 
the Republic of Indonesia. However, on the very same date, the Dutch had established the 
Government of Netherlands of New Guinea in West Irian. In that Treaty, the Dutch recognized 
Indonesian sovereignty, covering all territories of the former Netherlands East Indies, but―as 
though the wheel of fortune turned against Indonesian nationalists―it was with the exception of 
West Irian. The West Irian position had been an issue which was to be discussed within a year. 
The unresolved status of West Irian in the 1949 Round Table Conference revealed the Dutch 
reluctance to cede the territory to independent Indonesia. A British official document recorded the 
Dutch argument that they did not enter into the Round Table Conference in 1949 with any intention 
of handing over West New Guinea to Indonesia.
 3
 They had fully reserved their position on this 
territory ever since 1945. They argued that Article 2 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty 




                                                          
1 Tarling (1998).  
2See for instant,  Justus and Van Der Kroef (1958). Justus 
3 FO 371/129517, Draft Cabinet Paper, 12.12.1957.  
4
 Ibid.  
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3. THE DUTCH REFUSALS 
As recorded in British official documents, the Dutch refusals were due to some major points. 
Firstly, they claimed that geologically, botanically, zoologically, ethnologically and linguistically 
West New Guinea was not part of Indonesia but rather of Oceania.  Only in small areas of the 
coastal fringe was Indonesian cultural influence found. 
Secondly, the Dutch claimed that West Irian still needed to remain under their administration 
for the sake of the Papuan people. They argued that Indonesia would not be able to administer the 
territory as Indonesia did not have a right to West Irian based on the fact that the majority of the 
people in the territory were Papuans, not Indonesians.  
Thirdly, as stated in a letter to the Secretary of State of United States of America on 16 
September 1949, the Dutch Foreign Minister mentioned that it was only through Dutch rule in 
West Irian that the territory stood the best chance of being developed according to the principle in 
Chapter XI in the United Nations Charter.  
Fourthly, the Dutch argued that it was difficult for them to cede West Irian to a new and 
inexperienced government like Indonesia. This issue was mentioned by the Dutch ambassador to 
the London Foreign Office on 18 October 1949.
5
  
Of course, there was a military reason. New Guinea provided the Dutch with a useful base in 
Hollandia, and they may have hoped that, should complete chaos arise in Indonesia whether 
through domestic discords or another world-wide war, circumstances might arise in which, being 
established already in the neighborhood and having a background of vast experience of the Indies, 
the Dutch might with the approval of influential sections of world-opinion, be able to re-establish 




4. THE REBUTTALS BY INDONESIA  
The Dutch‟s inclination to continue their military presence in the West Irian was not well-
received by the Indonesia. In fact, Indonesia was not so supportive to the West Irian‟s problem 
during the Round Table Conference of 1949 negotiation because they were worried that it would 
damage the power transfer conference that was being held. In other words, the question of West 
Irian was not a major issue at the Round Table Conference.
7
  
The claim proposed by the Dutch on the ethnological basis, however, was refuted by 
Indonesia. On the ethnological issue, the Indonesians pointed out that though (the people of) New 
Guinea may not be Indonesian, “equally it is not the Dutch either; and though New Guinea may be 




                                                          
5 DO 35/2862, Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, no. 374, 22 October 1949. 
6 Ibid. 
7 DO 35/5985, United Nation General Assembly, A/2694, 18 Ogos 1954, 9th Session, Supplementary List of items for the 
agenda of the ninth regular session of the General Assembly: Item proposed by Indonesia. The Question of West Irian (West 
New Guinea). Letter dated 17 August 1954 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, 
addressed to the Secretary General, p. 3.  
8 DO 35/2863, Dutch New Guinea, Research Department, Foreign Office, INDO/8/49, 21 October 1949. 
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Indonesia had also rebutted that historically West Irian had connections to Maluku that was 
formerly under the rule of the Tidore Sultanate, which was a part of the Malay Archipelago 
kingdom before it fell under Dutch colonialization. Indonesia felt that the perpetuation of Dutch 
power in West Irian was tantamount to the colonization of their territory and one that posed a threat 
to its national border.
9
 Besides, Indonesia could not accept the Dutch consideration for occupying 
the West Irian as a way of looking after the concerns of Europeans who were still staying in the 
territory.  
 
5. SUPPORTING THE DUTCH ARGUMENTS 
The arguments put forth by the Dutch to justify their continued presence in West Irian were 
well supported by the British. For instance, a letter from the Foreign Department to the Secretary of 
the Committee of the Chief of Staff had mentioned about the British position on the future of the 
Dutch military, air base and sea defense in Indonesia.
 10
 The British thought West Irian should 
remain under Dutch administration although they were cognizant of the fact that West Irian would 
be returned to Indonesia after 1949. The letter also mentioned: 
As you are probably aware, the Round Table Conference (1949) decided that the Netherlands 
Government should surrender sovereignty over the naval bases of Surabaya to the Indonesian 
Government, but that the base should continue to be run by a Netherlands officer selected by the 
Indonesians, and the Royal Netherlands Navy should enjoy certain facilities there. It was also 
agreed that the status of Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) should be decided by further 
discussion between the two parties during the course of 1950.
11
  
Britain also had the same opinion about the national principles of the Papuans which was 
widely divergent from that of the Indonesians. They asserted that the Dutch had a right to stay in 
West Irian should they have no intention of giving up as they had governed the people of the Papua 
for a long time. The British accepted this sentimental reason for the Dutch to continue staying in a 
territory that they had occupied for 300 hundred years. 
 The future of West Irian was also discussed in the Joint Planning Staff meeting at British 
Foreign Office. In their discussion, Sir George Creasy from British Navy suggested that the report 
would be more concrete with the inclusion of an addendum to its conclusion. The addendum 
suggested that “The United States of Indonesia cannot be counted a stable and friendly regime at 
present and we should therefore encourage the Dutch to remain in New Guinea.”
12
 The suggestion 
was seconded by R.H. Scott. The statement above clearly illustrated British position that they had 
doubt about the future of Papua under independent Indonesia.  
From the perspective of strategy, according to the British, based on the importance of West 
Irian to the defense of the Pacific, it should be ensured that the transfer of power was truly stable 
and that the government in question truly ready.  Therefore, according to the British, West Irian 
should remain under Dutch administration until such a time deemed more suitable. On the stand of 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
10 CO 537/6284, Future of Dutch military, naval and air bases in the East Indies, COS (50) 79, 1 March 1950. 
11 Ibid. 
12 CO 537/6284, Strategic importance of New Guinea JP (50) 20 (7), meeting at 20 July 1949. 
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the British, The Department of Foreign Relations stated that until November 1949, they were still 
discussing the details of the matter and expected that both sides would exchange views and this 
would influence any resolution. 
 
6. BRITISH INTERESTS AND POLICY   
Inevitably, there were practical reasons for the British to support the Dutch insistence to retain 
its colonial power in West Irian namely, military geo-strategic, economic, communication route, 
geographical strategic network, and Russia‟s threat on Australia. Generally speaking, British policy 
on West Irian in the post-Indonesian independence was concerned with their own Strategic 
importance. Nevertheless according to Tarling, the British policy on West Irian was not really 
important to them. He claimed that, “…For Britain, New Guinea (West Irian) itself had a low 
priority…” because the territory did not directly involve British interest.
 13
 
However, this area was important to Britain due to several aspects as follows: 
a. There is no direct United Kingdom interest in this problem, but there is an indirect interest on 
both strategic and political grounds. 
b. In the strategic field the importance of Eastern New Guinea for the defense of Australia 
makes it desirable that Western New Guinea should remain under the control of a stable and 
friendly government.  
c. On political grounds, the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia might eventually 




The indirect interest also concerned Australia, a close ally of the British in Asia, for the 
guarantee of its security. A large part of Australia‟s territory was situated in West Irian proximity. 
The island was already declared in 1946 as part and parcel of the South Pacific region by virtue of 
the territory‟s importance in the Second World War. This was due to the fact that in that period, 
Irian had been a battle theatre between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. The importance of 
Irian was apparent when it joined the United States and Australian military in the fight against the 
Japanese. 
Strategically, to the British, the whole of the island of New Guinea was a very suitable base for 
their army. In one British document, it was mentioned that “… Although the large island of New 
Guinea is divided into the territories of Dutch New Guinea, North East New Guinea and Papua, but 
it is, for all practical purposes, now (during the Second World War) considered as a whole and 
embraced by the South West Pacific Command.”
15
  
In short, British and Australian interest in New Guinea was due to geo-strategic factors of the 
island, especially from the aspect of Australia‟s defense and security.
16
 Apart from the above 
mentioned, their naval and air bases in West Irian could control the northern region right up to 
                                                          
13 Tarling (2000).  
14 DO 35/2863, Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian), 19 December 1950. 
15 AIR 40/1739, List of airfields, landing grounds, and seaplane bases. New Guinea, amendment 1/2/1944 and 1/6/1944. 
16 AIR 40/1739, General British interest, as indicated by the number of British subject, annex in the Letter from H.B. White 
at Percy Island, to Deputy Director of Navigation, Brisbane, 12 January 1936. 
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Australia. The British Chief of Staff revealed the strategic facility of the territory, especially from 
the aspect of a naval base facility.
 17
 According to him, in Hollandia, the coastal area of the Strait 
would be able to accommodate a few carriers and destroyers.  
There were also two wooden wharves that had the capacity of 30000 to 35000 tons and 12 
cranes, while Manokwari, despite there being only one port, was a good place to land. In Sorong, 
there was also a port and in Doorn Island, there was a central jetty. The British also identified a port 
in Babo that could accommodate a 5000-ton ship. Babo also had navigable rivers for medium-sized 
ships. The straits area could accommodate bigger ships.
18
 
There was a port in Fakfak with a depth of between 144 to 222 feet that would easily 
accommodate ships up to 1,500 tons. There was a sheltered harbor in Kaimana that had the depth 
of 15 to 45 feet. In Port Moresby there was a Strait that was three miles wide and had the depth of 
between 42 to 72 feet that could be turned into an army base. This harbor had excellent landing 




From the naval strategy point of view, on the one hand, New Guinea was a good stop in the sea 
route which connected harbors in Western Australia and Singapore, the Philippines and Japan. On 
the other hand, this network was also open to enemy submarine attacks. In the same development, 
there was limited well-defended and safely refueling facility for their ships in this area. The 
existence of these harbors and natural sea facilities in Australian-New Guinea and Manus were 
strategically important to Britain. Australia had developed that area as a northern base. 
Comparatively, the harbors in West Irian were, despite not having great importance as the harbors 
of Australian-New Guinea, still very much needed by the Allies (Western powers). Britain needed 




From the point of view of air communication, the northern Irian territory base was needed to 
connect to other areas including Australia and the Philippines. To the British, although the 
importance of West Irian was rather marginal, its general location was crucial in the protection of 
Indonesia or the Philippines in the event of enemy attacks. The highest concern was the possible 
threat to Australia‟s defense and security should West Irian ever be enemy occupied. For this 
reason, Britain advocated, at the very least, an increase in the preparation of internal surveillance in 
order to prevent any possible threat from ever happening.  
On the whole, Britain concluded that although strategic facility in Dutch-New Guinea was not 
very important to the Allies, possible threats on both the Australian and Australian New Guinea 
harbors, justified that Dutch-New Guinea should be taken seriously. Nevertheless, the harbors in 
Australian-New Guinea and Papua were crucially needed for control of sea communication, enemy 
control of which would bring about huge implications on Australia. 
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Britain‟s interest in geographical strategic network in that territory was very obvious. Irian 
waters, especially Halmahera and Seram Sea in the northwest region and the south of the Bird‟s 
Head territory, that is, in the coastal area of Sorong Peninsula, the coastal areas of Aru Sea and 
Timika, together with the Strait in the east of Nusatenggara and Ombai Babar, were the main routes 
of nuclear submarines sailing between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean.
21
 
There was another issue that had an impact on British strategic consideration in Indonesia 
namely, Indonesia‟s inclination to forge an alliance with Russia. Britain believed that this scenario 
was a threat to the Western powers in Southeast Asia. It was also considered a threat to sea 
communication in the region. Due to Russia‟s influence in Indonesia that was seen as threatening 
Australia, Britain felt that: 
It has been agreed that, owing to the need to concentrate resources on more vital treatments, 
allied strategy in this region should be defensive. The aim, therefore, should be to employ the 
minimum forces in the area; we should not therefore be able to undertake extensive military 
operations to obtain strategic requirements in Indonesia.
22
  
As discussed above, the question of Australian security was one of the factors that shaped 
British policy in Indonesia. A letter from the British High Commissioner in Canberra stated that 
Australia was crucial British naval defense in Southeast Asia and when this was connected to the 
importance of Australia, it therefore directly involved the importance of West Irian. This was due 
to the fact that the close relationship between Indonesia and Russia was seen as a threat to the 
position of Western allies in Southeast Asia and also British sea communication network in the 
region. Therefore, in the event of Russian occupation of Indonesia, it would create a serious threat 
to Australia. Britain thus felt that West Irian was vital in the communication control and defense 
strategy between Britain and Australia. This strategy was also a tool to prevent further development 
of Russian influence in the coastal areas of the Pacific. 
There was also an economic reason. West Irian territory was among the best areas in Indonesia 
to provide extra space for the settlement of surplus population from the nearby islands. Apart from 
that, the British were of the opinion that the Dutch would most likely think of West Irian as a 
potential economic centre in the future. This was due to the potential difficulties in getting the 
economic opportunities in other Indonesian territories. By making West Irian their centre for 
economic activities, the Dutch would be able to continue their commercial activities across 
Indonesia through their middle men - the Chinese merchants. 
At the same time, there was the potential of petroleum in that region. This development was 
seen as an opportunity to serve the petroleum needs of various petroleum companies, especially 
those owned by the Dutch that were operating in Sumatra, should their operations there be 
terminated.
23
 At the same time, there were commercial interests on the raw materials found in the 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 CO 537/6284, Future of Dutch military, naval and air bases in the East Indies, Annex to JP (49) 114 (Final), 14 October 
1949.  
23 This tendency is closely related to British less reliance on oil production from West Asia as a result of the crisis in the 
Suez Canal in 1959. Accordingly, British welcome any steps taken to reduce their dependence on Middle East oil 
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area. Another interest included a control of human trafficking (slavery) of the local people by 
foreign traders. There was also the interest of sea trading route through the Strait of Torres. For the 
British, New Guinea was important to them specifically for the development of their commercial 
prospects in the territory following high demand by the British on pearls and copra between the 
1930s and 1940s. These two commodities were the main exports of Solomon Island and British 
New Guinea during that period. 
Britain was, however, willing to accept Indonesia‟s authority over West Irian should the matter 
be the outcome of successful talks between the two sides. The rejection and isolation of Indonesia 
was to be avoided by the international body and the Western countries. In June 1950, the Cold War 
tension had escalated to Korean War. Britain felt that it was absolutely crucial to avoid any action 
that would push Indonesia into an alliance with Russia.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Although it was not precisely stated in any document, the reason for British support of the 
Dutch regime in West Irian apparently could be perceived as „evil necessity.‟ It was inevitable 
measure as there were practical agenda to serve British own interest in terms of military geo-
strategic, economic, communication route and geographical strategic network, behind their support 
but it is evidently clear that British support for Dutch colonialism in West Irian  was  because they 
were more confident  in the Dutch than Indonesia in protecting West Irian from the menace of  any 
external intrusion such as the communists and Russia from setting up their base on the island which 
could endanger this region. The British had no confidence in the newly independent Indonesia 
because they (Indonesia) had no experience in administering and managing the state and its 
territories. In the eyes of the British, Indonesia could not be counted as a stable and friendly 
regime. In fact, if West Irian was not colonized by the Dutch, it would be taken by the Indonesia 
and this unstable and unfriendly regime (viv. Indonesia) would set up a precedent to claim to other 
territories belonging to the British.  This paper concludes that the Dutch colonial regime was 
perceived as „evil necessity‟ by the British because they had doubts about the future of West Irian 
should it be under independent Indonesia. In fact, Britain feared if West Irian was not colonized by 
the Dutch and were taken by the Indonesia, the West Pacific region would become politically, 
economically and socially unstable. Therefore, from June 1950, as the Cold War tension escalated 
to Korean War, this policy was influential in shaping British policy and became the driving factor 
in the development of British policy in Indonesia specifically in West Irian. Britain felt that it was 
absolutely crucial to avoid any action that would push Indonesia into an alliance with Russia and 
China. 
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